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"The sin of cynicism is mortal, because it propagates a self-
validating picture of reality. If men are told complacently enough
that this is how things are, they will become accustomed to it and
accept it. And in the end this is how things will be."
-Alexander Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch
I. INTRODUCTION
The debate over what extent, if any, judges should consult
"foreign" or international law when deciding cases has triggered
controversy throughout the political spectrum. In 2004, The Con-
stitution Restoration Act was proposed in the Senate with biparti-
san support.' If the law had passed, federal courts would have
been prohibited from adopting any "constitution, law, administra-
tive rule, Executive order, directive, policy, judicial decision, or
any other action of any foreign state or international organization
or agency, other than the English constitutional and common
* I would like to dedicate this article to the loving memory of my father Louis
Edward Hogue. I would also like to thank Professor Stephen Schnably for his
invaluable input, Shannon Greco for her encouragement, and all the editors of the
University of Miami Inter-American Law Review.
1. S. 2082, 108th Cong. § 302 (2004). Title III of the bill, threatens judges with
impeachment if they incorporate any of these prohibited sources into their rulings.
Id.
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law."12 The proposed legislation represented a single front in an
intellectual skirmish between two diverging viewpoints; this arti-
cle will juxtapose these competing paradigms as "sovereigntists"
and "internationalists."
Peter Spiro has argued that the "sovereigntists" are filled
with scholars, policy makers, and judges who are skeptical and
hostile to international law and institutions because of the per-
ceived threat they pose to American culture and democratic sover-
eignty.' Conversely, Judith Resnik defines "internationalists" as
assuming that "interpretations of constitutional and statutory
provisions should evolve, and they welcome learning from
abroad."' Both models have adherents on the United States
Supreme Court. Conservative justices like Justice Antonin Scalia
adhere to the sovereigntist paradigm and view the consultation of
international law as a means to augment judicial discretion, and
has referred to judicial reliance upon international law as illicit
and willful.' Whereas more liberal justices like Justice Stephen
Breyer speak favorably of citing international and foreign sources
as a means of strengthening human rights at home and abroad.'
This latter viewpoint prompts one to ask the questions: to what
extent do these foreign sources of international law bind not only
the federal government, but state governments as well, and how
do we reconcile international commitments abroad with principles
of federalism at home?
Medellin v. Texas illustrates the outgrowth of this debate.' In
Medellin, the state of Texas refused to comply with the Interna-
tional Court of Justice's ("ICJ") Avena decision, which had ruled
that the United States had violated the Vienna Convention by
failing to inform 51 Mexican nationals of their convention rights
that entitled them access to consular services to assist them with
2. Id. at § 201.
3. See Peter J. Spiro, The New Sovereigntists: American Exceptionalism and Its
False Prophets, 79 FOREIGN AFF. 9 (2000). Peter Spiro is also attributed with coining
the term sovereigntists. Id.
4. Judith Resnik, Law's Migration: American Exceptionalism, Silent Dialogues,
and Federalism's Multiple Ports of Entr'y, 115 YALE L.J. 1564, 1569 (2006).
5. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 369 (1989).
6. See generally STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR
DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION (Alfred A. Knopf 2005); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Looking
Beyond Our Borders: The Value of Comparative Perspective in Constitutional
Adjudication, 22 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 329 (2004); John Paul Stevens, Judicial
Activism: Ensuring the Powers and Freedoms Conceived by the Framers for Today's
World, 16 CHI. B. AsS'N REC. 25 (2002).
7. Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008).
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their habeas petitions.' President Bush issued a memorandum to
the Attorney General stating that the U.S. would "discharge its
international obligations under Avena by having State courts give
effect to the decision."' Relying on the President's memorandum,
Medellin, a Mexican national filed a second Texas state-court peti-
tion challenging his capital murder conviction.'" The Texas Court
of Criminal Appeals dismissed the petition stating that neither
Avena nor the President's memorandum was binding federal law
that preempted the state's autonomy in such matters." The case
of Medellin elucidates a subtle, yet important trend in the
Supreme Court to tarnish international law as a means of
strengthening principles of federalism at home, which may serve
to propagate the perception of American exceptionalism, and dis-
engagement from the broader international community.
Part II of the article explores the dialogu~e between the sover-
eigntists and internationalists, and provides the framework for
understanding the implications of the Supreme Court's decision in
Medellin. Part III of this article examines the formative cases
that established the Supreme Court's approach to treaty interpre-
tations, and how the Court has adopted international law into its
legal analysis. Part IV focuses on the cases leading up to the
Supreme Court's landmark decision in Medellin, and offers a nar-
rative tracing the trajectory of the jurisprudence of American
exceptionalism. Part V offers a more detailed and narrow analysis
of Chief Justice Roberts's opinion in Medellin that reads like the
sovereigntists' critique, and Justice Breyer's dissent that particu-
larly resembles arguments made by internationalists. Part VI of
the article places Medellin within the framework of the new feder-
alism and extrapolates upon fundamental differences between
that case, and other cases arising under the commerce clause.
The article concludes with predictions concerning the conse-
quences of the Roberts Court's weakening international law as a
means of strengthening federalism.
II. FRAMING THE DEBATE: THE SOVEREIGNTISTS AND
INTERNATIONALISTS PARADIGMS
In the final book before his death, Samuel Huntington
embraced the sovereigntist paradigm and predicted America's cul-
8. Id.
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tural and economic decline.' While Huntington was not alone in
this criticism, it was uncharacteristic for a scholar best known for
his scholarly writings on international relations (writings that
accurately predicted the "third wave" of democracy in Latin
America and the eventual "clash of civilizations" marked by global
terrorism at the end of the Cold War) to write a book focusing
solely on American identity.'" What was not uncharacteristic of
Huntington's critique was his bleak outlook for the future;
throughout his final work, he exuded an American exceptionalist
posture. In a controversial passage, Huntington observed, "[uln the
end, the United States of America will suffer the fate of Sparta,
Rome, and other human communities. Historically the substance
of American identity has involved four key components: race,
ethnicity, culture, and ideology. The racial and ethnic Americas
are no more. Cultural America is under sige" John Bolton, for-
mer United States Ambassador to the United Nations, reverber-
ated these sentiments, "in substantive field after field-human
rights, labor, health, the environment, political military affairs,
and international organizations-the Globalists have been
advancing while the Americanists have slept.""5
Both Bolton and Huntington paint a Manichean picture of a
sinister force threatening and undermining the fabric of American
society, but what exactly is that force? For sovereigntists, the
incorporation of foreign law into American jurisprudence repre-
sents a force that threatens democracy and resembles the soft tyr-
anny that Alexis de Tocqueville warned of in his concluding
chapter of Democracy in America.'16 Sovereigntists promulgate the
12. See generally SAMUEL HUNTINGTON, WHO ARE WE? (Simon and Schuster U.K.
Ltd 2004).
13. Samuel Huntington is credited with coining the "third wave" to describe the
envelopment and trajectory of liberal democratic capitalism at the end of the Cold
War. He is also credited with the concept of the "clash of civilizations," which warned
that conflicts would emerge in the post Cold War based on ethnic conflict and
religious fundamentalism. See generally SAMUEL HUNTINGTON, THE THIRD WAVE:
DEMOCRATIZATION IN THEf LATE TwENTIETH CENTURY (University of Oklahoma Press
1991); see also SAMUEL HUNTINGTON, THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS AND) THE REMAKING
OF WORLD ORDER (Simon & Schuster 1996).
14. SAMUEL HUNTINGTON, WHO ARE WE? 12 (Simon and Schuster U.K. Ltd 2004).
15. John R. Bolton, Should We Take Global Governance Seriously, 1 CIHI. J. INT'L
L. 205, 206 (2000).
16. See ALEXs DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 663 (University of
Chicago Press 2002) (1835) ("[Mt does not tyrannize, it hinders, compromises,
enervates, extinguishes dazes, and finally reduces each nation to being nothing more
than a heard of timid and industrious animals of which the government is the
shepherd.").
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belief that when courts rely upon foreign law, they are arrogating
power to themselves, resulting in a democratic deficit."7 This par-
ticular critique is emblematic of a wider conservative legal cri-
tique of the countermajoritarian nature of judicial review, the
need for judicial restraint and general principles of federalism.
The majority opinion in Medellin honed in on this broader con-
servative critique of the democratic deficit, which would arguably
augment itself further if courts were to effectuate foreign judg-
ments by binding the states."8
Conversely, prominent internationalists like Harold Hongiu
Koh believe international law may serve to actually effectuate
human rights for individuals who are otherwise shut out from the
democratic process because of social, political and other utilitarian
laws put in place by the majority." To delineate this point fur-
ther, Justice Kennedy incorporated both foreign and international
law in Lawrence v. Texas .20 By relying upon these sources, Justice
Kennedy debunked the argument that laws criminalizing homo-
sexual sodomy were not deeply rooted in western civilization."'
Even though this argument was employed at the highest level of
generality, it had coalesced a 5-4 majority in Bowers v. Hard-
wick. 2 Internationalists, like Anne Marie Slaughter, argue that
such judicial methodologies are laudable and judges should "see
one another as fellow professionals in a profession that transcends
national borders.*2 Moreover, she also argues "Ijiudges from dif-
ferent legal systems should expressly acknowledge the possibility
of learning from one another based on relative experience with a
particular set of issues and on the quality of reasoning in specific
17. See generally Patrick M. McFadden, Provincialism in United States Courts, 81
CORNELL L. REV. 4, 37-38 (1995) (arguing against the use of foreign law because of the
democratic deficiency). "International law is generated in ways far removed from the
citizens of the United States and, indeed, from the citizens of other nations." Id.
18. See Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 494 (2008).
19. See Harold Hongju Koh, The 1998 Frankel Lecture: Bringing International
Law Home, 35 HOUSTON L. REV. 623, 626-27 (1998).
20. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
21. Id. at 560. "An adult male resident in Northern Ireland alleged he was a
practicing homosexual who desired to engage in consensual homosexual conduct. The
laws of Northern Ireland forbade him that right . . .. The court held that the laws
proscribing the conduct were invalid under the European Convention on Human
Rights." Id.
22. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194 (1985) (stating that "the
proscriptions against sodomy have very 'ancient roots.' Decisions of individuals
relating to homosexual conduct have been subject to state intervention throughout
the history of Western civilization.").
23. Anne Marie Slaughter, Judicial Globalization, 40 VA. J. INT'L L. 1103, 1124
(2000).
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decisions."2
For both the sovereigntists and the internationalists, the con-
flicting paradigm poses a threat not so much to ideology, but to
"first principles" of constitutional fidelity.25 For the sovereigntist,
integration of international law by domestic courts compromises
democratic values of horizontal separation of powers and vertical
federalism." This article will focus on the latter portion of that
argument.
The internationalist paradigm contrasts starkly with the
sovereigntist and views the incorporation of international law by
domestic courts as an important step towards transnationalism
and global governance needed for a global community. Harold
Koh utilizes the term "vertical domestication" to describe this phe-
nomenon."~ "'[V]ertical domestication' occurs through transna-
tional law, whereby international law norms 'trickle down' and
become incorporated into domestic legal systems."" Some inter-
nationalists have contended that incorporating international and
foreign law into domestic law effectively serves to protect domestic
minorities that are effectively "fenced out" from the political pro-
cess locally, and would benefit from the execution of international
human rights treaties. An example of this comes from the case of
Lawrence v. Texas. The plaintiffs at issue in that case were ostra-
cized and excoriated by the majority for their sexual mores, and
the Court was able to utilize foreign law as a vehicle to undermine
assumptions that such laws were prevalent throughout western
civilization .29 For internationalists, the sovereigntists' disdain for
international law goes beyond American exceptionalism, and elu-
cidates an apprehension rooted in an animus towards courts that
24. Anne Marie Slaughter, A Global Community of Courts, 44 HARV. INT'L L.J.
191. 217 (2003),
25. First principles will be referred to throughout the article to describe the level
of value judges attribute to various aspects of the Constitution. For example, the
Rehnquist Court attributed a great deal of value to the Tenth and Eleventh
Amendments, and a first principle of that Court was to strengthen federalism.
Whereas the Warren Court radically applied a combination of the Due Process and
Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the criminal justice
system to realize its first principle of strengthening civil liberties.
26. Horizontal separation of powers refers to the checks and balances in the
federal government. Vertical federalism refers to the relationship between the
federal government and the states.
27. Koh, supra note 19, at 626-27 ("vertical domestication" occurs through
transnational law, whereby international law norms "trickle down" and become
incorporated into domestic legal systems).
28. Id.
29. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 560 (2003).
260
2010] MEDELLIN V TEXAS21
exercise judicial review by striking down state legislation based
upon the judge's predilections for expanding individual liberty and
equality; thus infringing upon principles of federalism.
Synthesizing these divergent views would be a Herculean
task within itself, and these converging paradigms illustrate the
stakes both schools of thought have within the issue. However, in
a legal system that requires principled legal judgments in order to
bind the nation under the rule of law, it is important to analyze
what precedential value, if any, domestic courts should accord
international law. Moreover, at what time does international law,
foreign judgments, or treaties that the United States is a party to
bind both federal and state governments; and thus, become part of
our law? The Court in Medellin tried to answer these questions,
but in doing so created a new doctrine for interpreting treaties,
which calls into question the outcome of future cases and contro-
versies arising under the supremacy clause. Furthermore, the
new approach to treaty interpretation may impact the President's
ability to implement treaties, which will inexorably impact foreign
relations if the legislature must effectuate all treaties and inter-
national agreements for them to have the force of domestic law.
In effect, such a requirement might actually serve to impair Exec-
utive power in the realm of foreign relations, and significantly
empower the states, signifying new frontiers for federalism that
extend beyond the truly local, and impact the international.
III. MARSHALL COURT AND LOCHNER ERA SUPREME COURT
DECISIONS REGARDING TREATY INTERPRETATION
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
Treaty agreements between the United States and a foreign
country that are negotiated by the President are permitted under
Article 11, Section 2, Clause 2 of the United States Constitution .3 0
Once the Senate ratifies these treaties, they become the supreme
law of the land pursuant to Article VI."1 However, treaties cannot
have the binding force of law if they violate the Constitution. In
Reid v. Covert, Justice Black explained, "no agreement with a for-
eign nation can confer power on the Congress, or on any other
branch of Government, which is free from the restraints of the
Constitution. 3 This general principle finds its origins back dur-
30. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, ci. 2.
31. U.S. CONST. art. VI.
32. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16 (1957).
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ing the tenure of Chief Justice Marshall. However, interpreting
treaties in order to determine their accordance with the United
States Constitution has not always been ameliorative towards
continuity. In fact, even Chief Justice Marshall's approach pro-
duced somewhat inconsistent outcomes."3
In Foster v. Neilson, the Court held that "treaties sometimes
require implementation by Congress before they may be enforced
in the Courts. 3 However, merely four years later in United
States v. Percheman, the Court overruled Foster, holding the same
treaty provision to be self-executing. In Whitney v. Robertson,
the Court explained that when a statute and a treaty "relate to the
same subject, the courts will always endeavor to construe them so
as to give effect to both, if that can be done without violating the
language of either; but, if the two are inconsistent, the one last in
date will control the other.136  Ostensibly, this approach makes
logical sense when there are two conflicting treaties; yet, this
approach provides little consistency. According to Carlos Manuel
Vazquez, "[What exactly makes a treaty non-self-executing has
long been a matter of uncertainty. "37 Treaties that are non-self-
executing cannot be given effect unless the legislature acting
through the Senate ratifies the treaty by a two-thirds majority
vote as required by the Constitution, or the legislature acts on the
treaty in some other way.3"
The majority opinion in Medellin drew upon the Marshall
Court's opinion in Foster to develop the argument that treaties
that are non-self-executing, or acted upon by the legislature, can-
not be given effect by domestic courts. However, while Foster pro-
vides credence for this approach to treaty interpretation,
subsequent courts through much of American history have not
required that the legislature effectuate the treaty in order for it to
33. Compare Foster v, Neilson, 27 U.S. 253 (1829), with United States v.
Percheman, 32 U.S. 51 (1833).
34. Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. 253, 255 (1829).
35. See generally United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. 51 (1833).
36. Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888).
37. Carlos Manuel Vazquez, Treaties as Law of the Land: The Supremacy Clause
and the Judicial Enforcement of Treaties, 122 1HAv. L. REV. 599, 628 (2008) (showing
the differences between Foster and Percheman). The Court in Foster finds the
subsequent actions by Congress in effectuating the treaty as dispositive to its binding
effect on domestic law; conversely, in the earlier case of Percheman, the Court did not
look to whether Congress took steps to effectuate the treaty in order for it to have the
force of domestic law. Id.
38. Id. at 628. There is no consensus on what other way the legislature could act
upon the treaty, but absence of consensus does not necessarily mean impossibility.
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have the force of domestic law."9 Conversely, these courts were
deferential to the political branches on matters of international
commitments regardless of the impact these international agree-
ments had on the states.
Mark Strasser has argued that treaties cannot be interpreted
as violating the Tenth Amendment and infringing upon state sov-
ereignty.' 0 Strasser uses Missouri v. Holland, a case involving the
Migratory Bird Treaty, to illustrate this point in his case study."'
Holmes sought to clarify the confusion that had arisen under ear-
lier judicial interpretations, "[aicts of Congress are the supreme
law of the land only when made in pursuance of the Constitution
...It is obvious that there may be matters of the sharpest exi-
gency for the national well being that an act of Congress could not
deal with."
Medellin ignored the less stringent and functional approach
to treaty interpretation of Holland by requiring that the legisla-
ture ratify, or act upon the compulsory ICJ judgment to give the
decision the binding effect of the law. The court in Medellin analo-
gized its approach to Justice Jackson's concurrence in Youngstown
Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, which provides a tripartite scheme
for evaluating executive power.4" Unlike Holland, the Youngs-
town approach limits the discretion and authority of the executive
to act outside the express will of Congress." This latter approach
used by the Court in Medellin represents a doctrinal shift in the
standard of review from one of deference to Article II back to the
more stringent requirement for treaty interpretation in Foster v.
Neilson, which requires Congressional effectuation." This raises
an important question: if such a stringent requirement is placed
on the Executive, how can the President effectively execute his
39. See generally Olympic Airways v. Husain. 540 U.S. 644, 649 & 657 (2004).
(holding an airline liable for the wrongful death of an international passenger where
the flight attendant's refusal to reseat the passenger was clearly external to the
passenger, and was unexpected and unusual).
40. Mark Strasser, Domestic Relations, Missouri v. Holland, and the New
Federalism, 12 Wm & MARY BILL RTS. J. 179 (2003).
41. The Migratory Bird Treaty Act of 1918, 16 U.S.C. § 703 (2004).
42. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920).
43. See generally Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
Part IV of this article provides a more detailed analysis of the way Medellin shifted
the standard of review for treaty interpretation into the Justice Jackson's tripartite
scheme in Youngstown. See infra Part IV.
44. See generally Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952)
(J. Jackson, concurring).
45. See Koh, supra note 19.
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international obligations ? 4 1
Around the time Missouri v. Holland was decided, the
Supreme Court had already begun the process of "vertical domes-
tication" of international law into the body politic of the American
political system.4 " The most notable and quotable example to
illustrate this integration came from the case of The Paquete
Habana, which memorably declared, "international law is part of
our law."4 In that case, the Court integrated customary interna-
tional law with American law. Justice Holmes used a similar
method in Missouri v. Holland, which established a more func-
tional approach to effectuating international agreements, but also
illustrates "vertical domestication" of international law.4" How-
ever, the case proffered an analysis that went beyond just the
issues and facts presented in the case; Justice Holmes's analysis
of a "living constitution" had consequences beyond the standard of
review for interpreting treaties and international agreements.
Justice Holmes wrote:
with regard to that we may add that when we are dealing
with words that also are a constituent act, like the Consti-
tution of the United States, we must realize that they have
called into life a being the development of which could not
have been foreseen completely by the most gifted of its
begetters. It was enough for them to realize or to hope that
they had created an organism; it has taken a century and
has cost their successors much sweat and blood to prove
that they created a nation. The case before us must be con-
sidered in the light of our whole experience and not merely
in that of what was said a hundred years ago.50
Subsequent courts would use this analysis to broaden the scope of
liberty and equality under the Fourteenth Amendment's equal
protection and due process clauses, often to the detriment of
states' reserved powers.
An example of the application of the "living constitution"
framework into a domestic legal matter utilizing international law
came in 1958 in Trop v. Dulles .5 ' The case involved an army
deserter who lost his citizenship under the Nationality Act of
46. See infra Part V.
47. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
48. Id. at 700.
49. See generally Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
50. Id. at 433.
51. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
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1940.5 In an opinion written by Chief Justice Warren, the Court
held that under the Eighth Amendment "denationalization as a
punishment is barred" as this is "the total destruction of the indi-
vidual's status in organized society.""3 The majority opinion
declared, "the words of the [Eighth] Amendment are not precise
and their scope is not static. The Amendment must draw its
meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of maturing society.""4 To justify this "evolving standard
of decency" the Court did not rely on the text of the Constitution,
the history of the United States, or its traditions. Instead the
court looked to international law and took note of the fact that
lit] he United Nations' survey of the nationality laws of 84 nations
of the world reveals that only two countries, the Philippines and
Turkey, impose denationalization as a penalty for desertion. In
this country the Eighth Amendment forbids that to be done.""5 It
is noteworthy that the Court did not feign that the original mean-
ing of the Constitution forbade such a punishment; the majority
also failed to comment on the fact that desertion normally leads to
execution in the military. In his dissent, Justice Frankfurter
asked, "[us constitutional dialectic so empty of reason that it can
be seriously urged that loss of citizenship is a fate worse than
death?"" Justice Frankfurter's observation proved particularly
Panglossian, considering later Courts would invoke the "evolving
standards of decency" of the majority opinion to declare that the
implementation of the death penalty by numerous states offended
such standards as well.5"
Cases like Holland and Trop inspire internationalists and
their liberal counterparts, who see principles of international law
as a means of strengthening liberty and equality at home. On the
other hand, cases like these provide sovereigntists and their con-
servative counterparts ammunition to argue that judicial incorpo-
52. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
53. Id. at 101.
54. Id. at 100-0 1.
55. Id. at 103.
56. Id. at 125.
57. See generally Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (declaring the death
penalty as applied in Georgia unconstitutional); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976)
(reinstating the death penalty in Georgia); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977)
(forbidding the death penalty for the rape of a woman); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S.
304 (2002) (holding that executing the mentally retarded violates Eighth
Amendment); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (holding that the death penalty
for juvenile offenders offends the Eighth Amendment); Kennedy v. Louisiana, 129 S.
Ct. 1 (2008) (holding the death penalty for child rape unconstitutional; must look to
the evolving standards of decency).
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ration of international law arrogates judicial discretion and
imposes foreign values into domestic law, which are devoid of con-
stitutional legitimacy. The jurisprudence of American exception-
alism delineates this latter point, and provides further context for
understanding the intellectual history leading up to Medellin, and
its consequences both domestically and internationally.
IV. THE ROAD TO MEDELLIN: THE JURISPRUDENCE OF
AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM
Unlike the cases of Holland and Trop, the Supreme Court has
not always embraced the internationalist paradigm, and has at
times been hostile towards it. As previously delineated, the Court
has shown reluctance to expand the scope of constitutional rights
extraterritorially. In De Lima v. Bidwell,"8 the same Court that
had decided The Paquete Habana a year earlier held that the Con-
stitution applies only to residents in territories that have been for-
mally incorporated into the United States through treaties, or acts
of Congress.5 9 Nevertheless, this reluctance to expand constitu-
tional rights extraterritorially did not preempt aliens from avail-
ing themselves of constitutional protections once entering the
territorial jurisdiction of the United States. However, during the
era of the Rehnquist Court, the Court began narrowing the expan-
sion of constitutional rights to foreign nationals both within and
outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.' 0
In 1990, in the case of United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez,
Chief Justice Rehnquist employed the sovereigntists' critique on
the issue of whether the Fourth Amendment applied when a DEA
agent conducted an illegal search of the home of a foreign criminal
suspect living in Mexico, and the government used that evidence
to convict them in a federal court .6 ' The Chief Justice wrote,
"[T~he people" protected by the Fourth Amendment, and by
the First and Second Amendments, and to whom rights and
powers are reserved in the Ninth and Tenth Amendments,
refers to a class of persons who are part of a national com-
munity or who have otherwise developed sufficient connec-
tion with this country to be considered part of the
community. . .. There is likewise no indication that the
Fourth Amendment was understood by contemporaries of
58. 182 U.S. 1 (1901).
59. See generally De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1 (1901).
60. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265 (1990).
6 1. Id.
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the Framers to apply to activities of the United States
directed against aliens in foreign territory or in interna-
tional waters.6
In a sharply worded dissent, Justice Brennan criticized the
majority's reasoning for what he saw as a willful whittling down of
the Fourth Amendment: "[by concluding that respondent is not
one of 'the people' protected by the Fourth Amendment, the major-
ity disregards basic notions of mutuality. If we expect aliens to
obey our laws, aliens should be able to expect that we will obey our
Constitution when we investigate, prosecute, and punish them."6
The notion of mutuality that Justice Brennan discussed was
rooted in international law, and offered a subtle critique of Ameri-
can exceptionalism. While the Chief Justice's opinion in Verdugo-
Urquidez was arguably inflammatory, the holding itself did not
represent a break from precedent, and unlike Medellin it did not
call into question prior precedents. In fact, the holding of the case
did not break from the established precedent in Bidwell, which
recognized that the protections of the Constitution do not extend
extraterritorially into jurisdictions that have not been incorpo-
rated into the United States by an act of Congress."
Despite the international backlash, merely two years after
Verdugo-Urquidez was decided, the counterrevolutionary guard of
the Rehnquist Court would deny relief to an alien that had suf-
fered an injury inside the territorial jurisdiction of the United
States as a result of his kidnapping by federal law enforcement
officials in Mexico .65 The subsequent outcomes from Verdugo-
Urquidez and the repudiation of international law by the Rehn-
quist Court, which resulted in international backlash, prompts
one to consider future precedents by the Roberts's Court after its
decision in Medellin.
The international attention and outcry by the Supreme
Court's decision in United States v. Alvarez -Machai 6 6 paralleled
the controversy surrounding Medellin. The facts and history sur-
rounding the case read more like a screenplay than a Supreme
Court case. The story begins in 1985 with the torture and mutila-
tion of an undercover DEA agent in Mexico by a reputed Mexican
drug lord. The ensuing investigation implicated Dr. Humberto
62. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 265 & 267.
63. Id. at 284.
64. See generally De Limna v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1 (1901).
65. See United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992).
66. Id.
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Alvarez-Machain in the murder."7 Five years later, mercenaries in
privity with the DEA abducted Dr. Alvarez-Machamn and flew him
to El Paso, Texas, where he was officially arrested."8 Dr. Alvarez-
Machamn, the plaintiff/victim, won his case in the Ninth Circuit. In
a two-page opinion, the Ninth Circuit relied on its opinion in
Verdugo, even though the Supreme Court had refused to apply
this interpretation of the law.6" The Ninth Circuit ruled in favor of
Alvarez-Machamn, because Mexico had officially filed its protest in
a United States federal court.7 0 For the Ninth Circuit, Mexico's
official protest satisfied the standing requirement." Nevertheless,
when the case came before the Supreme Court, the Court rejected
the respondent's international law arguments and gave sparse
deference to the amicus brief filed by the country of Meic.
The reasoning employed by the majority in Alvarez-Machain
foreshadowed its opinion in Medellin. The Court rejected the
argument that the language of the U.S.-Mexico Treaty should be
read in the light of prevailing international law."8 Chief Justice
Rehnquist wrote, "[ilt would go beyond established precedent and
practice to draw such an inference from the Treaty based on
respondent's argument that abductions are so clearly prohibited
in international law that there was no reason to include the prohi-
bition in the Treaty itself"" The Court's decision in Alvarez-
Machamn broadened its ruling in Verdugo-Urquidez. Going for-
ward, the Supreme Court would reject arguments based on inter-
national law, because those arguments were at variance with the
Court's interpretation of separation of powers.7 Like Medellin,
the Court's holding in Alvarez-Machamn was universally criticized
in the international community, and far from inconsequential. For
instance, in Mexico,
reaction to the decision was uniformly unfavorable. The
Mexican government had previously made its position clear
by submitting an amicus curiae brief to the Court. The
67. See generally id.
68. See Bradley Thrush, United States' Sanctioned Kidnapping Abroad: Can the
United States Restore International Confidence in Its Extradition Treaties?, 11 Amu.
J. INT'L & Comp. L. 181, 185 (1994).
69. See generally United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 939 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir.
1991).
70. Thrush, supra note 68, at 204.
71. See generally Verdugo-Urquidez, 939 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1991).
72. See Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259.
73. United States v. Alvarez-Machamn, 504 U.S. 655 (199)2).
74. Id. at 666 & 668-69.
75. See generally Alvarez-Machamn, 504 U.S. 655.
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Court acknowledged and then discarded Mexico's argu-
ments. Mexico reacted to the decision with more than ver-
bal attempts at persuasion. It suspended cooperation with
the United States efforts to control illegal drug trafficking,
banned all DEA activities in Mexico, demanded that the
Extradition Treaty between the two countries be renegoti-
ated, and requested that the United States surrender those
persons responsible for the abduction."6
Alvarez-Machain signified a strategic victory for the sovereigntist
paradigm; not only did the Court repudiate respondent's interna-
tional law argument, but the Court eschewed the arguments
raised in Mexico's official brief as well."7 The internationalists'
response joined the universal milieu condemning the decision.
The Supreme Court for the first time seemed to say: yes, there is
international law; however, there is an American exception to it.
Rather than retreat in the face of international criticism, the
outcry emboldened several of the Justices, and they calibrated
their response with a line of decisions that went further. In
Breard v. Greene,"8 the Rehnquist Court placed the United States
in direct conflict with the International Court of Justice for the
first time. The per curiam. opinion of the Court was written in a
tone far more acerbic for what was otherwise a benign holding.
The Court narrowed its holding to a procedural formality. The
petitioner, a citizen of Paraguay, was denied a stay of execution
for his capital murder conviction of an American citizen.7 " Breard
filed a habeas motion in federal district court, alleging that arrest-
ing authorities violated the Vienna Convention on Consular Rela-
tions because they failed to inform him that, as a foreign national,
he had the right to contact the Paraguayan Consulate. 0 The trial
court concluded that Breard procedurally had defaulted on his
claim by failing to raise it in state court.8 " The court of appeals
affirmed."2 However, the Supreme Court limited the scope of the
treaty and held that "absent a clear and express statement to the
contrary, the procedural rules of the forum State govern the
implementation of the treaty in that State.""
76. Thrush, supra note 68, at 182-83.
77. See generally Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655.
78. 523 U.S. 371 (1998).
79. See id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 373.
82. See Breard v. Pruett, 134 F.3d 615 (4th Cir. 1998).
83. Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 375 (1998).
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The salience of the Supreme Court's message was clear for all
that listened: international law could not displace a State's crimi-
nal procedural law, and the Vienna Convention did not provide a
foreign national with a private right of action in U.S. courts. More
importantly, the outcomes of the cases raised questions of interna-
tional law and questions of whether or not international law and
treaties bind individual states. The intersection between interna-
tional law and federalism represented an important front in the
Rehnquist Revolution.84 The Supreme Court had already curbed
the excesses of the federal government by anointing itself the
guardian of the states; it only made sense for the Court to protect
states from the judgments of foreign courts.
IV. MEDELLIN AS A DUAL CASE STUDY IN FEDERAkLISM
AND AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM
Like most cases before the Supreme Court, Medellin did not
merely present a unique federal question existing in a vacuum,
but addressed a question derived from the outcome in a related
case, Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331 (2006). Like Medel-
lin, Sanchez-Llamas arose in the wake of the International Court
of Justice's ("ICJ") decision in Avena and Other Mexican Nationals
(Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12 (Mar. 31). In Avena, the ICJ held
that the United States had violated Article 36(l)(b) of the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations by failing to inform fifty-one
named Mexican nationals of their Vienna Convention rights."'
The ICJ held that those named individuals were entitled to review
and reconsideration of their U.S. state-court convictions and
sentences regardless of their failure to comply with generally
applicable state rules governing challenges to criminal convic-
tions.8 " Once again, in Sanchez-Llamas, the Court's decision was
directly at variance with international law and represented
another victory for the sovereigntists' paradigm.
The question presented in Sanchez-Llamas was whether a
state could admit incriminating statements made to police as evi-
84. See generally, Mark Tushnet, Observations on the New Revolution in
Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 94 GEO. L.J. 1627 (2006). The term the
"Rehnquist Revolution" has been used ubiquitously to describe the doctrinal shift of
the Rehnquist Court's federalism jurisprudence, which shifted power away from the
federal government and empowered states through the 10th and 11th Amendments.
Id.
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dence against a defendant, even if the evidence was obtained in
violation of the Vienna Convention. Writing for the majority,
Chief Justice Roberts wrote that "[a]s far as the text of the Con-
vention is concerned, the question of the availability of the exclu-
sionary rule for Article 36 violations is a matter of domestic
law.... The exclusionary rule as we know it is an entirely Ameri-
can legal creation. 8 Chief Justice Roberts went on to write that
l[lt is implausible that other signatories to the Convention
thought it to require a remedy that nearly all refuse to recognize
as a matter of domestic law."8 ' Moreover, relying upon its earlier
decision in Breard, the Court reiterated that Article 36 claims,
which were not raised in a timely manner, were procedurally
barred by state rules."0
The Supreme Court's decision in Sanchez-Llamas and its
refusal to give the ICJ's Avena judgment effect prompted interna-
tional outcry and caused embarrassment for the White House.
President Bush "then issued a memorandum stating that the
United States would 'discharge its international obligations'
under Avena 'by having State courts give effect to the decision. "'91
Relying on the President's memorandum and the ICJ's decision in
Avena, Jose Ernesto Medellin challenged his capital conviction
and death sentence for the rape, torture, and murder of a teenage
girl in Texas."2 The Texas Court of Appeals rejected Medellin's
second petition for habeas corpus as an abuse of the writ, "con-
cluding that neither Avena nor the President's Memorandum was
binding federal law that could displace the State's limitations on
filing successive habeas applications. 9 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari on the grounds of two important federal
questions.
First, is the ICJ's judgment in Avena directly enforceable as
domestic law in a state court in the United States?94 Sec-
ond, does the President's Memorandum independently
require the States to provide review and reconsideration of
87. See Sanchez-Llamas, 548 U.S. at 337.
88. Id. at 343.
89. Id. at 344.
90. Id. at 351.
91. Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 498 (2008).
92. See generally David Stout, Justices Rule Against Bush on Death Penalty Case,
N.Y. Tuars, Mar. 25, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/25/Washington/25cnd-
texas.html?-.r=l&scp=l&sq=%22Justices%20Rule%20against%2OBush%2Oon%20
Death%20PenaltyO/2OCase%22&st=cse.
93. Medellin, 552 U.S. at 498.
94. Id.
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the claims of the 51 Mexican nationals named in Avena
without regard to state procedural default rules? 5
The first question prompts a singular analysis concerning the
level of generality and degree international law and judgments
should bind states. Whereas, the second question coincides more
broadly with a vertical separation of powers issue, the limitations
placed upon Article 11, and the Supremacy Clause. Nevertheless,
both questions intersect with federalism and build upon the theme
that state's retention of broad sovereignty fulfills an intrinsic role
in our democratic republic. As the Court answered each of the
questions, the decisions were cumulatively strengthening the
power of the states at the expense of not only international law,
but the power of the federal government itself.
On the first issue, Medellin argued that the ICJ's judgment in
Avena was binding on the states, because it was the "supreme law
of the land" by virtue of the Supremacy Clause."6 This reading of
Avena coincides with the internationalists' paradigm regarding
international laws and treaties. The majority opinion, reasoned
that this reading of the treaty ignored the distinction the Marshall
Court had drawn between treaties that are self-executing and
those requiring congressional statutes.97 Chief Justice Roberts
interpreted Foster v. Nielson"8 as holding that a treaty was
equivalent to an act by the legislature (subsequently abrogated by
United States v. Percheman).99 The Court in Percheman held that
treaties were not self-executing and had to be enforced through
legislation. 0 0 Furthermore, the majority opinion in Medellin went
on to say that there is a background presumption that
"Iilnternational agreements, even those directly benefitting pri-
vate persons, generally do not create private rights or provide for
a private cause of action in domestic courts.""' 1
A. Chief Justice Roberts's Majority Opinion
Chief Justice Roberts criticized Medelin's first contention
(ICJ judgments automatically became binding domestic law
because of the Supremacy Clause) on the basis that this line of
95. Id.
96. Id. at 503.
97. Id. at 504.
98. 27 U.S. 253 (1829).
99. Medellin, 552 U.S. at 505.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 506 n.3 (citing RESTATEMENT (TIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 907
cmt. a (1986)).
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reasoning would emasculate the political branches of govern-
ment. 102 To support his point, Chief Justice Roberts drew heavily
from not only constitutional law, but international law as well.
Specifically, he emphasized Article 94 of the U.N. Charter, which
states that the sole remedy for noncompliance with a judgment
rendered by the ICJ rests within the purview of the Security
Council of the United Nations' discretion.' According to the
Medellin majority, even the U.N. (the body that created the ICJ)
did not intend for the ICJ judgments to be enforceable in the
domestic courts of member states. Regardless, the Security Coun-
cil must effectuate the ICJ decisions before they become binding.
Hence, if ICJ judgments were automatically enforceable as
domestic law, as Medellin contended, there would not be a need
for the Security Council to act upon them. Therefore, Medellin's
argument that ICJ judgments are domestically binding on U.S.
courts through the Supremacy Clause serves to undermine the
role of the Security Council in implementing those decisions.
Chief Justice Roberts's reasoning on this point axiomatically leads
to the conclusion that if the Court granted Medellin's petition, it
would grossly usurp the power of the political branches of govern-
ment to decide whether or not to execute ICJ judgments.'
Next, Roberts turned to Chapter XIV of the U.N. Charter,
which created the ICJ, to hone in on the first wave of his two-front
assault upon Medellin's first argument. Drawing from his previ-
ous opinion in Sanchez-Llamas, Roberts reiterated the argument
that the ICJ can only hear disputes between national govern-
ments, and Article 34(1), 59 Statute 1059 provides that only the
parties involved in a case are bound by the ICJ decision.' 5 Follow-
ing this reasoning one must ponder how Medellin, a person who
cannot be a party to an ICJ proceeding under any circumstances,
can claim a private right of action based upon that proceeding? If
one answers the Chief Justice's question in the negative, than it is
nearly impossible for any future litigant claiming a right of action
under the ICJ to have standing to assert the claim.
Before moving on to the second question that Medellin's peti-
tion raised, the majority launched a textualist and originalist ana-
lytical assault. Responding to the dissent, Roberts wrote about
the importance of looking at the language and text of a treaty
102. Id. at 511.
103. Id. at 509.
104. Medelin v. Texas, 502 U.S. 491, 511 (2008).
105. Id.
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before determining whether or not it is self-executing. Thus, the
majority opinion stated "we do think it rather important to look to
the treaty language to see what it has to say about the issue. That
is after all what the Senate looks to in deciding whether to
approve the treaty.'10 6 According to the majority, this interpretive
approach was the same one Chief Justice Marshall stated in Fos-
ter, in that "the point of a non self-executing treaty is that it
'addresses itself to the political, not the judicial department; and
the legislature must execute the contract before it can become a
rule for the Court."" 7 The majority opinion went on to point out
that the framers intended for treaties to become binding federal
law only through the political branches of government. 08 There-
fore, because the political branches of government have not acted
to enforce the Avena judgment, the power to enforce the judgment
falls outside the purview of the Court's power. "To read a treaty so
that it sometimes has the effect of domestic law and sometimes
does not is tantamount to vesting with the judiciary the power not
only to interpret but also to create the law." 09
Before turning to the second question, the majority opinion
uncharacteristically explained both why the original ICJ decision
in Avena was flawed and the deleterious consequences of inter-
preting such a decision as binding domestic law."0 The majority
pointed out that not only would giving ICJ judgments domestic
effect have pernicious consequences upon states, but would also
result in adverse exclusionary effects on federal law. The Chief
Justice wrote, "there is nothing in [Medellfn's] logic that would
exempt contrary federal law from the same fate.""' However,
within the same paragraph, the majority paralleled the conse-
quences of international law displacing federal statutes alongside
foreign law annulling state criminal convictions."' By doing so,
the Chief Justice underscores a dynamic that would not only
invade the sovereignty of states, but would place the federal gov-
ernment in equal peril. This is the dynamic that the sovereign-
tists and American exceptionalists fear the most, the loss of
106. Id. at 514.
107. Id. at 516.
108. Id. at 515.
109. Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 515 (2008).
110. Id. at 517-18 ("We already know, from Sanchez-Llamas, that this Court
disagrees with both the reasoning and result in Avena.").
111. Id. at 518 (citing Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 119 (1933) ("ILlater-in-
time a self executing treaty [may] supersede a federal statute if there is a conflict.")).
112. Id.
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sovereignty and the decline of the nation state, at the expense of
an aggrandizing foreign or international entity.
The second substantive question Medellin posed for the Court
focused on the President's power to issue a memorandum compel-
ling the states to give effect to the Avena judgment. Medellin
argued that the President's February 28, 2005 Memorandum to
Texas preempted Texas's procedural default rule for raising objec-
tions regarding the state's failure to provide Medellin with access
to consular services. 113 In its amicus brief to the Court, the United
States argued that the President had broad enough powers to
effectuate the judgment under Article 11 to resolve foreign policy
issues, and to act in matters of foreign affairs. 1 ' Relying on
Youngstown, the majority set up the framework to explain that
this power, while plenary, still has its limits. The majority uti-
lized Justice Jackson's tripartite framework in order to show that
President acts at his lowest ebb of power with regard to giving
effect to judgments of the ICJ.115 It is noteworthy to add and is
perhaps an irony of Supreme Court history that Chief Justice Rob-
erts (former clerk for Chief Justice Rehnquist) overlooked his
predecessor's warning: "Justice Jackson himself recognized that
his three categories represented 'a somewhat over-simplified
grouping.' "'116 Rehinquist would have likely had the upper hand in
this argument considering that he had clerked for Justice Jack-
son, and helped to write Justice Jackson's concurrence in
Youngstown."'1
Regardless of this irony, the majority opined that the Presi-
dent did not have the authority to implement Avena based on his
obligation that the laws be faithfully executed.' "The President
113. Id. at 525.
114. See generally Brief for United States as Ainicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner,
Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008) (No. 06-984).
115. Justice Jackson's concurrence in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343
U.S. 579 (1952) established a framework that evaluates executive action in three
areas. First, "[Wihen the President acts pursuant to an express or implied
authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for includes all that he
possesses in his own right plus all that Congress possesses." Youngstown, 343 U.S. at
635. Second, "[When the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant or
denial of authority, he can only rely upon his own independent powers, but there is a
zone of twilight in which he and Congress may have concurrent authority." Id. at 637.
Third, "[wihen the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or
implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb." Id.
116. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 669 (1981).
117. See WnLW~m REHNQUIST, THE SuPREmE COUJRT 188 (Alfred P. Knopf 2001)
(1987).
118. U.S. CONST. art. 11, §3, cl. 4.
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has an array of political and diplomatic means available to enforce
international obligations, but unilaterally converting a non-self-
executing treaty into a self-executing one is not one of them."119
Relying on Federalist No. 47, which delineates the substantive
discussion of checks and balances found in the Federalist Papers,
the majority singularly focused on the fact that the President can-
not unilaterally make a law.2 0 By bypassing Congress and writ-
ing a memorandum to the states to give effect to the Avena
judgment, the President exceeded his power under Article HI. The
fact that the President acts as a representative of the United
States before the United Nations, the ICJ, and the Security Coun-
cil speaks only to the President's responsibilities, however, it does
not speak to the President's power to unilaterally implement
those agreements made abroad at home. 2 1 Furthermore, the Con-
stitution does not bestow upon the President the power to divest
states of their reserved powers. 22 By extending this argument,
the Court was saying that, if such broad power were relinquished
to the President, he would be capable of imposing international
agreements meant to bind nation states upon local governments.
Not only would the relinquishment disrupt the separation of pow-
ers in the federal government, but it would also upset vertical fed-
eralism, which plays an intrinsic role in protecting the liberty of
individuals in our democracy. This latter point was made more
explicitly at the conclusion of the majority's opinion, which also
prompts one to consider (if not conclude) that the protection of
states was the first principle guiding the Court.
The majority opinion concluded that the President's actions
were an unprecedented infringement and offended the dignity of
the states. 23 The majority took pains to write that the states
should retain sovereignty in criminal matters and the President's
actions were anathema to that principle. Specifically, Chief Jus-
tice Roberts wrote:
[i~ndeed, the Government has not identified a single
instance in which the President has attempted (or Con-
gress has acquiesced in) a Presidential directive issued to
state courts, much less one that reaches deep into the heart
of the State's police powers and compels state courts to reo-
pen final criminal judgments and set aside neutrally appli-
119. Medelin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 525 (2008).
120. Id. at 527.
12 1. Id.
122. See id.
123. Id. at 527.
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cable state laws. . . . (citation omitted) (States possess
primary authority for defining and enforcing criminal
law). 124
Therefore, the President could not rely upon his Article II powers
to compel the state of Texas to annul the conviction of the peti-
tioner Medellin.
Examining the majority's opinion, one can infer overtones of
American exceptionalism intersecting with the doctrine of federal-
ism. While the rhetoric does not have the alacrity of Justice
Scalia's earlier writings excoriating the usage of international
law, the decision itself marks an epochal new period in the weak-
ening of international law as a means of strengthening federalism.
Medellin marks a crossroads in this new period for constitutional
law, because in a string of opinions the Rehnquist Court departed
from the consensus that international law was American law-a
consensus that found its apex in Missouri v. Holland. Subsequent
case law during the Warren Court era provided certainty in that
area of the law for the better part of the twentieth century.
Throughout the 1990s and the early part of the twenty-first cen-
tury, while the rest of the world was engaging in globalization and
eagerly experimenting in transnational governance, the United
States Supreme Court was disengaging American constitutional
law from such internationalists aspirations and making the
United States the exception to that movement.
B. Justice Breyer's Dissent
Nevertheless, like most matters that come before the Court,
there was hardly unanimity in the Medellin decision. Justice
Breyer's spirited dissent took issue with the majority's reasoning
and the damage he thought it would cause to America's interna-
tional prestige, his concerns also coinciding with many of the
internationalists themes. Unlike the majority, which reserved its
stronger arguments for the latter part of its opinion, the dissent
places the constitutional predicate of the Supremacy Clause at the
forefront. Justice Breyer begins by quoting directly from Article
VI, clause 2 of the U.S. Constitution: "all Treaties ... which shall
be made ... under the Authority of the United States, shall be the
supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be
bound thereby."
Like the majority, the Justice Breyer's dissent emphasized
124. Id. at 532.
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the earlier precedents of the Marshall Court. Justice Breyer dis-
agrees that Percheman abrogated Foster v. Nielson, and that a
presumption exists that not all treaties are self-executing. 12 5 More
importantly, Justice Breyer points out that the United States has
signed and ratified a series of treaties obliging it to comply with
ICJ judgments in cases in which it has given consent to the ICJ to
exercise that authority, '2 ' He points out that the United States
submitted itself to this compulsory judgment, and Congress did
nothing to suggest the contrary. 27 Therefore, because Congress
had not acted at variance with the President's memorandum, the
President was acting within the realm of the second level of the
Youngstown tripartite. There is an area of concurrent power
between the President and Congress, and within this twilight of
power, the President can act if Congress does not prevent him
from doing so.
The next section of Justice Breyer's dissent turned its analy-
sis toward the textual and originalist critiques of the Court's opin-
ion. Justice Breyer argued that the majority relied too heavily
upon the language of the treaty, and their own opinions of what
the Founders thought about international law and the binding
impact treaties have on domestic law. To answer that question,
Breyer wrote: "[Wile must look instead to our own domestic law, in
particular to the many treaty-related cases interpreting the
Supremacy Clause. Those cases, including some written by Jus-
tices well aware of the Founders' original intent, lead to the con-
clusion that the ICJ judgment before us is enforceable as a matter
of domestic law .... "I The dissent points out a case from 1840
that showed "instances in which treaty provisions automatically
became part of domestic law were common enough for one Justice
to write that 'it would be a bold proposition' to assert 'that an act
of Congress must be first passed' in order to give a treaty effect as
'a supreme law of the land.""" Justice Breyer relied on that case
to challenge the majority's assumption and the new perfunctory
rule that there are two types of treaties, self-executing and non-
binding. The dissent emphasized that "the majority does not point
to a single ratified United States treaty that contains the kind of
'clear' or 'plain' textual indication for which the majority
125. Id. at 527.
126. Medellin, 552 U.S. at 527.
127. Id. at 538.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 544-45 (quoting Lessee of Pollard's Heirs v. Kibbe, 39 U.S. 353 (1840)).
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searches.""' 0
Regarding the question of whether or not the Avena judgment
should have the effect of domestic law, the dissent provided three
reasons why it should. First, the language of the relevant treaties
from which the ICJ emanates support direct judicial enforceabil-
ity."3 ' The optional protocol in the treaty that the United States
was a party to had the title "Compulsory Settlement of Dis-
putes.""3 ' The dissent points out that the language "compulsory"
presupposes that the outcome of such a settlement will bind the
nations that are parties to such disputes. Conversely, the protocol
also has proceedings that are not compulsory, and because the
United States opted for a forum with compulsory settlement, the
ICJ judgment should have the effect of domestic law. Moreover,
"in accepting Article 94(1) of the Charter, 'each member. . . under-
takes to comply with the decision' of the lCJ 'in any case to which
it is a party.""3113 Therefore, the state of Texas and the Court's
refusal to give such judgments binding effect places the United
States in dereliction of its international commitments. Unlike the
majority's assessment that the treaty lacks binding language, the
dissent argues that for the purposes of the Supremacy Clause, the
Court had found language in treaties that were much more equiv-
ocal and gave them the force of domestic law."3 ' For example, in
areas of substantive matters like property, commerce, contracts
and other disparate areas of the law, the United States has
enforced 1CJ judgments even if those areas are traditionally
within the regulatory realm of the states. 135 Therefore, because
courts have held that the Supremacy Clause binds states to ICJ
judgments, ICJ judgments have the power of binding the domestic
courts of the states even in matters of criminal procedure.
The dissent argued the right Medellin sought was not a pri-
vate right of action infringing upon the sovereignty of Texas, but
rather a substantive, individual right that happens to intersect
with a state's rules of criminal procedure. 3 3' Through this lens,
130. Id. at 547.
131. Id. at 551.
132. Medellin, 552 U.S. at 551.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. A few examples of these preemptory issues include: Convention on
Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, 20 U.S.T. 2941, 2943-
2947; Convention on International Civil Aviation, 61 Stat. 1204 (1944) (seizure of
aircraft to satisfy patent claims); Patent Cooperation Treaty, 28 U.S.T. 7645, 7652-76,
7708, T.I.A.S. No. 8733 (patents).
136. Medellin, 552 U.S. at 556.
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the consequences for federalism are not so palpable and merely
require that a state abide by uniform standards that are constitu-
tional. Justice Breyer elucidates a litany of treaties that have
been held constitutionally binding and affects a state's criminal
procedure. Justice Breyer pointed out that:
[ti his Court has found similar treaty provisions self-execut-
ing. See, e.g., Rauscher, 119 U.S., at 410-411, 429-430, 7 S.
Ct. 234, 30 L. Ed. 425 (violation of extradition treaty could
be raised as defense in criminal trial); Johnson v. Browne,
205 U.S. 309, 317-322, 27 S. Ct. 539, 51 L. Ed. 816 (extradi-
tion treaty required grant of writ of habeas corpus);
Wildenhus's Case, 120 U.S., at 11, 17-18, 7 S. Ct. 385, 30 L.
Ed. 565 (treaty defined scope of state jurisdiction in crimi-
nal case). ... [Slee also id., at 18 ("To the extent that there
are conflicts with Federal legislation or State laws the
Vienna Convention, after ratification, would govern"). And
the Executive Branch has said in this Court that other,
indistinguishable Vienna Convention provisions are self-
executing. 13 7
Thus, Justice Breyer's analysis elucidates that the majority's
assertion that the right Medellin seeks to vindicate is novel
because it displaces a state's criminal procedure, misconstrues
previous case law. However, Justice Breyer focuses his concerns
more toward the negative implications of the United States' fail-
ure to carry out its obligation under the Avena judgment.
According to the dissent, the Court's refusal to compel Texas
to honor the Avena judgment calls into question at least 70 other
treaties with similar provisions. Just as the majority concluded
with a strong sovereigntist tone, Justice Breyer ends the first part
of his dissent echoing the internationalist's paradigm: "The conse-
quence [of this decision] is to undermine longstanding efforts in
those treaties to create an effective international system for inter-
preting and applying many, often commercial, self-executing
treaty provisions. "18Moreover, the decision would inundate Con-
gress with a hodgepodge of issues decided by international tribu-
nals that would have to be legislated upon before implementing.
According to Justice Breyer, "[lit seems unlikely that Congress
will find it easy to develop legislative bright lines that pick out,
provisions (addressed to the Judicial Branch) where self-execution
137. Id.
138. Id. at 560.
280
2010] MEDELLIN V. TEXAS21
seems warranted . 13 9 However, to reemphasize the Supremacy
Clause issue, the dissent argues "that it is not necessary for Con-
gress to do so-at least not if one believes that this Court's
Supremacy Clause cases already embody criteria likely to work
reasonably well. It is those criteria I would apply here.""'0
On the issue of Article II power, the dissent recognizes that
the majority opinion represents a significant break from tradi-
tional interpretations of presidential power."4 ' The dissent reiter-
ates the argument that Congress has acquiesced in the President's
actions; therefore, he falls into the second level of analysis in the
Youngstown framework, even if by doing so, he displaces state
law. "It is difficult to believe," Justice Breyer writes, "that in the
exercise of his Article II powers pursuant to a ratified treaty, the
President can never take action that would result in setting aside
state law."' Following this point, the dissent poses a hypotheti-
cal. Suppose the President believed it necessary that he exchange
a prisoner held in state custody in order to avoid a military
threat.' This hypothetical is not so far removed from reality con-
sidering prisoner swaps happen on a recurring basis in numerous
countries. However, under the doctrine of Medellin, the federal
government could not legally interfere in a state's criminal proce-
dure in order to effectuate such an international agreement with-
out going to Congress first.
This latter argument intersects with the competency of the
judiciary to determine foreign affairs. The dissent notes:
[gliven the Court's comparative lack of expertise in foreign
affairs; given the importance of the Nation's foreign rela-
tions; given the difficulty of finding the proper constitu-
tional balance among state and federal, executive and
legislative, powers in such matters; and given the likely
future importance of this Court's efforts to do so, I would
very much hesitate before concluding that the Constitution
sets forth broad prohibitions (or permissions) in this
area. 14
Justice Breyer ends his dissent pointing out that the Court's
abdication from precedent and its new doctrine of treaty interpre-
tation will ultimately create disrespect for the law. By failing to
139. Medellin, 552 U.S. at 560.
140. Id.
141. See id. at 563.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 565-66.
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honor the Avena judgment, which the president has taken pains to
execute, it projects the image around the world that there is an
American exception to judgments that go against the United
States, and U.S. courts think so little of international law that
they refuse to implement those decisions. This not only weakens
American prestige, but the rule of law itself "insofar as today's
holdings make it more difficult to enforce the judgments of inter-
national tribunals, including technical, non-politically-controver-
sial judgments, those holdings weaken that rule of law for which
our Constitution stands.""' 5
Often, the cases that make it to the Supreme Court represent
not so much a conflict of laws, or a clash of absolutes between
dueling socio-political forces within our society, but manifest
themselves through disagreements over first principles. For the
majority, the first principles Medellin centered upon were protect-
ing the sovereignty of the states from not only excesses of the fed-
eral government, but foreign judges meddling in the affairs of the
states. Conversely, the arguments the majority employed echoed
the sovereigntist critique, and for the most part relied upon the
tools of textualism and originalism. Whereas the dissent
responded with arguments similar to the internationalists para-
digm, and the dissent's reliance on the Supremacy Clause paral-
lels many of the arguments employed in federalism cases.
Medellin represents a nexus between these two streams of
jurisprudence, and encapsulates a new juridical propensity to
weaken international law as a means to strengthen federalism.
As noted before, Medellin did not occur in a vacuum, but was the
culmination of a string of cases not only weakening international
law but also exemplifying hostility toward it. Such jurisprudence
is far from inconsequential and has far-reaching consequences,
both positive and negative. These negative and positive externali-
ties will provide signposts that will help to augment an under-
standing of areas of law potentially affected by the decision in
Medellin and the broader ramifications on federalism. When the
Medellin holding was handed down, the majority of the commen-
tary focused on the consequences the decision would have on
international law, treaty interpretation, future international com-
mitments, human rights treaties and general rights for aliens. 4 1
145. Medellin, 552 U.S. at 565-66.
146. See generally Laura Moranchek Hussain, Enforcing the Treaty Rights of
Aliens, 117 YALE L.J. 680 (2008); David J. Bederman, Medellin's New Paradigm For
Treaty Interpretation, 102 Am. J. INT'L L. 529 (2008); Carlos Manuel Vazquez, Less
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However, not a single article was entirely devoted to the conse-
quences Medellin would have on vertical federalism and the weak-
ening of international law as a means of strengthening federalism
at home.
V. THE ROBERTS COURT AND NEW FRONTIERS FOR
FEDERALISM BEYOND THE TRULY LOCAL
Throughout the 1990s, at the behest of Chief Justice Rehn-
quist and his conservative brethren, in a series of cases, the Court
transformed the doctrine of the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments,
effectively placing a protective buffer between the states and the
federal government. While an extensive overview of these doc-
trines falls outside the scope of a single article; nonetheless, it is
important to provide a brief overview concerning the doctrinal
transformation that occurred during the Rehnquist era, which sig-
nificantly shifted the balance of power between the states and the
federal government and established the essential framework to
understanding the outcome in Medellin, as well as future cases
that will come before the Supreme Court.
The Constitution provides that Congress has the power "to
regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several
states. 4  Since the Marshall Court, Congress had been given the
elasticity to broadly pass legislation displacing state law pursuant
to its regulatory powers under the Commerce Clause .' During
the New Deal, Congress used the Commerce Clause to broaden
the powers of the federal government more extensively, and the
cases arising under that power were more controversial and
effected activities that were arguably strictly local.
The textbook illustration of this doctrinal development mani-
fested itself in Wickard v. Filburn. 1 4 1 Under the Agricultural
Adjustment Act, the secretary of agriculture set a quota for wheat
Than Zero?, 102 AM.t J. INT'L L. 563 (2008); Curtis A. Bradley, Intent, Presumptions,
And Non-Self Executing Treaties, 102 Am. J. IN'L L. 540 (2008); Tara J. Melish, From
Paradox To Subsidiarity: The United States and Human Rights Treaty Bodies, 34
YALE J. INT'L L. 389 (2009); Martha F. Davis, Upstairs, Downstairs: Subnational
Incorporation of International Human Rights Law At The End of An Era, 77 FoRDHAM
L. REV. 411 (2008); Carlos Manuel Vazquez, Treaties as Law of the Land: The
Supremacy Clause and the Judicial Enforcement of Treaties, 122 HAv. L. REV. 599
(2008); David J. Bederman, Medellin's New Paradigm For Treaty Interpretation, 102
Am. J. INT'L L. 529 (2008).
147. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
148. See generally Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824).
149. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
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production, and each farmer was given an allotment. 5 0 Filburn
exceeded his allotment of wheat in order to feed himself and his
family at subsistence. 151 He claimed the regulation of the wheat
he grew for home consumption exceeded Congress's power. Never-
theless, the Court held that even though Filburn's "own contribu-
tion to the demand for wheat may be trivial by itself, it is not
enough to remove him from the scope of federal regulation where,
as here, his contribution, taken together with that of many other
similarly situated, is far from trivial. 5  This principle later
became known as the substantial effects test.
Throughout the era of the Warren Court, the Court continued
to sustain Congress's controversial usage of the commerce power
to effectuate civil rights legislation, even if the linkage to economic
activity seemed tenuous to many observers. A core principle of
American constitutional law is that the federal government has
limited powers with a significant amount of powers reserved to
the states. Throughout most of the 20th century, the Court's
broad reading of the commerce power put nothing outside the reg-
ulatory realm of Congress. Robert Bork aptly described what he
characterized as the hubris of the Warren Court era through an
exchange he witnessed when he was a professor of law at Yale.
Justice Douglas, formerly a professor at the Yale law
school, visited the school when he was a leading figure on
the Warren Court. A student of mine asked him why the
government won every antitrust case, and he replied that
he was ashamed a Yale student had to ask such a question.
This was a period when one who took law and justice seri-
ously, as an intellectual discipline, as something more than
ultra-liberal politics, had reason to be extremely unhappy
with the Supreme Court of the United States.'
Between 1936 and April 26, 1995, the Supreme Court did not find
a single law passed by Congress to exceed the limits of the Com-
merce Clause."5 '
However, in line with a series of cases relying on the Tenth
Amendment, in United States v. Lopez, the Rehnquist Court
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 127-28.
153. ROBERT BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL. SEDUCTION OF THE
LAW 73 (1990).
154. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL. LAw: PRIN'CIPLES AND POLICIES 264 (3d
ed. 2006).
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struck down the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990.15 Writing for
narrow 5-4 majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded that the
presence of a gun near a school did not substantially affect inter-
state commerce. 56 Lopez was a turning point in the Rehnquist
Revolution and was followed by Printz v. United States in 1997. 117
Justice Scalia, writing for the same majority that decided Lopez,
struck down a provision of the Brady Handgun Violence Preven-
tion Act under the auspices that the provision violated the Tenth
Amendment. The provision required that state and local law
enforcement officers conduct background checks on people buying
handguns."5 ' Justice Scalia emphasized that Congress had
usurped the power of the states by "commandeering state officials"
to implement a strictly federal mandate."5 ' However, the Supreme
Court's subsequent decision in United States v. Morrison went fur-
ther than both these previous cases and brought the Court closer
to overruling Wickard v. Filburn.6 0
The same narrow 5-4 majority in Lopez joined Morrison in
declaring it unconstitutional for the federal government to regu-
late crimes involving violence against women under its commerce
clause powers. However, Morrison went further than Lopez in
regulating Congress's commerce power, and held that Congress
could not regulate a noneconomic activity by finding that, cumula-
tively, it has a substantial effect on interstate commerce."6 1 No
other justice summed up the Rehnquist Revolution's federalism
project more poignantly than the reluctant revolutionary Justice
Kennedy:
[fi ederalism was our Nation's own discovery. The Framers
split the atom of sovereignty. It was the genius of their
idea that our citizens would have two political capacities,
one state and one federal, each protected from incursion by
the other. The resulting Constitution created a legal sys-
tem unprecedented in form and design, establishing two
orders of government, each with its own direct relationship,
its own privity, its own set of mutual rights and obligations
to the people who sustain it and are governed by it.'
155. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
156. See id. at 567.
157. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
158. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 154, at 324.
159. Id.
160. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
161. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 154, at 264.
162. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995).
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Nevertheless, despite the soaring rhetoric, the revolution suf-
fered a major setback in Gonzalez v. Raich. 163 The Court held that
intrastate production of a commodity, such as marijuana sold in
interstate commerce, is economic activity and, therefore, could
have a cumulative effect on interstate commerce."~ Surprisingly,
it was Justice Scalia that disengaged from the Rehnquist Revolu-
tion's supreme phalanx in Gonzalez, and not Justices Kennedy
and O'Connor who had always been the more reluctant revolution-
aries."' 5 In an uncharacteristically bellicose tone, Justice
O'Connor decried the majority for ignoring the first principles of
the Rehnquist Court, "We enforce the 'outer limits' of Congress'
Commerce Clause authority not for their own sake, but to protect
historic spheres of state sovereignty from excessive federal
encroachment and thereby to maintain the distribution of power
fundamental to our federalist system of government.1166  Since
Gonzalez, the Court has not reviewed another major case chal-
lenging the constitutionality of Congress's commerce clause
power.
However, the setback for the federalism revolution caused by
Gonzalez v. Raich did not prevent the Supreme Court, under the
leadership of Chief Justice Roberts, from continuing its march
toward empowering the states. Both Sanchez-Llamas and Medel-
lin insulate states not only from the federal government but inter-
national law as well. Nevertheless, it is important to note that the
seismic shift in the power structure between the state and the fed-
eral government that occurred during the Rehnquist Revolution
occurred because the federal government sought to regulate in the
realm of things which were truly local. 16 1 Medellin extends beyond
the truly local and is international in its scope.
163. Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
164. See CHEMERINSRY, supra note 154, at 272.
165. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); see also Lawrence v.
Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 560 (2003). Both Kennedy and O'Connor declined to overturn
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), even though both of them had been in the majority
opinion of Webster v. Reproductive Health, 492 U.S. 490 (1989). Justice O'Connor
even went so far in an earlier opinion as to declare that "the Roe framework is on a
collision course with itself." City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health,
Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 458 (1983). In Lawrence, Justice O'Connor and Justice Kennedy
were instrumental in overturning Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), a case
they had both joined in the majority opinion, merely more than a decade before.
166. Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 42.
167. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567 ('iTihe Constitution's enumeration of powers does not
presuppose something not enumerated, and that there never will be a distinction
between what is truly national and what is truly local. This we are unwilling to do.")
(citations omitted).
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VI. TOWARDS A TRANSFORMATIVE JURISPRUDENCE
Despite the fundamental differences between local issues and
ones of international magnitude, the Roberts Court continues to
classify legal questions with international ramifications in the
context of federalism. By doing so, the Roberts Court has, and will
likely continue, to devolve power from the national government
over to the states at the expense of not only the federal govern-
ment but the international community as well. This important
development prompts a final postulate.
What stands in the way of a transformative jurisprudence
that incorporates international law into what the justices in the
Pacquette Habana rightfully recognized was "our law"?' The
answer is rather simple; it does not require a new legal doctrine to
emerge, providing a medium for judges to transcend their statist
parochialisms in favor of comity with the international commu-
nity. Such radical departures would be unwise and pernicious to
constitutional governance. However, the shift could occur if
judges return not so much to old doctrines and antiquated ata-
vism, but instead, adopted first principles that have guided judges
since the founding of the republic. Yet, these first principles are
not always readily identifiable, and even if they were, reaching
consensus is an arduous process. One may argue, if the Roberts
Court relinquished the mantel of the Rehnquist Revolution, this
may mark a return to the primitive. Would the restoration of the
belief that the federal government has broad enough powers
through the Supremacy Clause to bind the states in matters of
treaties and other compulsory foreign judgments signal a retreat
for new federalism? Sovereigntists would answer in the affirma-
tive while internationalists respond in the negative.
In the end, both groups ultimately confuse the issue as a zero
sum game, where a benefit for one inexorably triggers a detriment
to the other. Law should supersede these notions of mutual exclu-
sivity, and instead find common ground in principled judgments.
Medellin stands as a starting point for this dialogue, not the cul-
mination of it. Admittedly, "to insist one's own time and place is
at the core of the change is almost always problematic, tarnished
by a suspect autocentrism that gives undue weight to the signifi-
cance of changes that coincide with one's mortality and prefer-
168. The Pacquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700.
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ences a vantage point of space and time.""' 9
In spite of this natural human propensity, a recognition that
the Roberts Court stands at the precipice of a transformative
period, along with a return to first principles incorporates the wis-
dom of Chief Justice Rehnquist. The late Chief Justice correctly
recognized the essential role States fulfill in protecting liberty,
and Congress at the acquiescence of the Supreme Court had
exceeded its commerce clause powers. His successor might do well
to return from the wilderness of federalism's new frontier and
draw upon the wisdom of his predecessor who recognized the need
for reasoned change. Especially when the issues cut deeper than
the truly local and extend into the international.
169. RicHARD FAuLK, LAw IN AN EMERGING GLOBAL VILLAGE: A POST WESTPHALAN
PERSPEcTIV;E 5-6 (1998).
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